Published September 7, 2026 · Équipe Le Québec Vote
**The most reliable figure is $47.3 million.** That is how much Quebec's Ministry of Transport and Sustainable Mobility (MTMD) said it had spent by January 31, 2026, mainly on studies, reports, professional services and communications related to the Quebec City–Lévis Third Link, according to its [2026–27 budget-estimates responses](https://www.assnat.qc.ca/Media/Process.aspx?MediaId=ANQ.Vigie.Bll.DocumentGenerique_221411&process=Default&token=ZyMoxNwUn8ikQ%2BTRKYwPCjWrKwg%2BvIv9rjij7p3xLGTZDmLVSmJLoqe%2FvG7%2FYWzz). By then, the project still had no final route, construction price or firm schedule.
Another figure has circulated widely: **$127.6 million in contracts awarded since 2018**, according to [an MTMD compilation obtained by Le Journal de Québec](https://www.journaldequebec.com/2025/11/28/1276-m-en-contrats-octroyes-pour-le-3e-lien) and dated October 31, 2025. That is not an amount paid. It adds up the maximum value of contracts, several of which span years and are billed only when work is ordered.
The distinction matters. Saying Quebec "spent $127.6 million" would be wrong. Saying the changes in direction cost nothing would be equally wrong.
Our investigation therefore reaches a less dramatic but more defensible answer: **at least $47.3 million had actually been spent by January 31, 2026, while Quebec had awarded contracts worth as much as $127.6 million by October 31, 2025.** The government does not publish a register showing how much of each study remains useful after every route change. It is consequently impossible to calculate honestly how much was "wasted."
## Three figures that do not mean the same thing
| Figure | What it represents | What it does not represent |
|---|---|---|
| **$47.3M** | Cumulative MTMD spending reported at January 31, 2026 | The project's final cost or an up-to-date September 2026 total |
| **$127.6M** | Total value of contracts awarded since 2018, at October 31, 2025 | Money fully paid out |
| **$275M** | Planning envelope authorized in July 2025 | Spending already incurred |
The Union des Rives contract shows the trap. The consortium received a preliminary design and support mandate for the tunnel version. The contract was worth **$30,966,771**. [MTMD financial records for April 2026](https://cdn-contenu.quebec.ca/cdn-contenu/adm/min/transports/ministere-des-transports/acces-information/contrats-engagements/engagements_financiers/2026-2027/engagements-financiers-04-2026.pdf) show that when it ended on April 29, 2026, **$10,956,638.91** had been paid—roughly 35% of the ceiling. The abandoned contract therefore cost nearly $11 million, not $31 million.
That difference between a contract ceiling and an actual payment must guide any reading of this file.
## Different projects under the same name
The Third Link predates the CAQ. Quebec's Liberal government created a project office in 2017 and authorized a $20.5-million envelope. François Legault and the CAQ were already promoting the proposal before winning the 2018 election. Since then, a single name has covered several materially different projects.
- **2018–2019:** an eastern alignment in the Île d'Orléans area.
- **2020:** a shift toward downtown Quebec City and Lévis.
- **2021:** a large multi-lane tunnel under the river, estimated at about $10 billion.
- **2022:** a reduced twin-tube version presented at $6.5 billion.
- **April 2023:** road lanes abandoned; the link becomes transit-only.
- **Fall 2023–June 2024:** the file reopens and CDPQ Infra receives a regional mobility mandate.
- **June 2024–June 2025:** a highway link returns, followed by a central bridge-tunnel corridor.
- **2026:** that option is dropped; the project moves east again, with private financing and a toll under consideration.
These are not minor shifts of a few kilometres. A deep downtown tunnel, a central bridge-tunnel and an eastern link require different ground data, approaches, property acquisitions and engineering.
The stated rationale also changed. The project has variously been presented as a congestion solution, a transit corridor, a backup in case existing bridges close, and infrastructure for economic security and freight movement.
## What the contracts actually buy
Six major assignments account for approximately **$123 million**, or 96% of the $127.6 million in contracts identified at October 31, 2025:
| Assignment | Announced maximum value | Year |
|---|---:|---:|
| Opportunity study | $8.4M | 2018 |
| Geotechnical campaigns | $16.2M | 2020 |
| Preliminary tunnel design and support | $31.0M | 2022 |
| Parsons–Artelia–Hatch engineering services | $46.2M | 2025 |
| Englobe–AtkinsRéalis geotechnical investigations | $15.2M | 2025 |
| Gowling WLG legal services | $6.0M | 2025 |
| **Total** | **$123.0M** | |
The [**$46.2-million** assignment awarded to Parsons–Artelia–Hatch](https://www.journaldequebec.com/2025/04/16/un-contrat-majeur-de-462-m-pour-le-3e-lien) in February 2025 was meant to support the ministry for ten years, including choosing the structure and route, technical preparation and delivery method. The [**$15.2-million** assignment awarded to Englobe and AtkinsRéalis](https://www.journaldequebec.com/2025/04/22/contrat-de-152-m-pour-le-troisieme-lien) in August 2025 covers onshore and marine investigations across a broad zone between the Quebec Bridge and the western tip of Île d'Orléans. The [**$6-million** legal mandate awarded to Gowling WLG](https://www.journaldequebec.com/2025/09/22/ou-vont-vos-impots--des-avocats-a-6m-pour-le-troisieme-lien) in September 2025 includes tender documents, insurance, corporate and maritime law.
These task-order contracts are broad enough to survive some project changes. But the public does not know how much has been used, how much will serve the 2026 version, or whether the assignments must be changed for a privately financed toll project.
## About 100 boreholes across several corridors
Geotechnical investigations are the most visible field expense. According to the MTMD, [approximately 100 boreholes had been drilled](https://www.tvanouvelles.ca/2026/01/07/3e-lien-un-eventail-de-traces-sur-la-rive-nord) since 2018 across different corridors, at a cost of about **$19 million** by early 2026.
Rock, soil and river data do not automatically become useless when a line moves on a map. They can improve regional knowledge, reduce some risks and help when a future corridor overlaps a studied zone. That is the strongest argument against treating every change as a total write-off.
But reuse has obvious limits. Geotechnical data are location-specific. The farther a route moves, the less old data can replace drilling beneath new bridge foundations, tunnel portals or interchanges. Quebec has published neither a reuse map, nor a valuation of repurposed work, nor an analysis of money rendered obsolete.
That is the question opposition parties, auditors and citizens should ask: **for every abandoned version, which deliverables were reused, which were shelved, and what did each cost?**
## CDPQ Infra's report: an often-simplified conclusion
In 2024, [CDPQ Infra examined six road corridors](https://cdpqinfra.com/fr/actualites/communiques/cdpq-infra-presente-un-plan-directeur-ambitieux-pour-la-mobilite-dans-la) over roughly 25 kilometres, consulted 172 stakeholders and reviewed nearly 1,000 documents. Its mobility conclusion was unfavourable: projected traffic on a new road link was relatively low, relief on existing bridges would be limited, and congestion risked moving deeper into Quebec City's road network. Mobility gains alone did not justify a highway link.
The rest of the conclusion matters. CDPQ Infra said concerns about redundancy, economic security and freight movement were outside its mobility mandate and could be examined by the government. The next day, Quebec revived the highway link on precisely those grounds.
That is not proof that the project is necessary. It means **the current project's central rationale was not resolved by the mobility analysis**. A public, quantified assessment of the economic risks surrounding the existing bridges is therefore essential before billions are committed.
## Even the needs study was reframed
An [official 2019 study](https://cdn-contenu.quebec.ca/cdn-contenu/adm/min/transports/transports/projets_routiers/Capitale-Nationale/lien-interrives-capitale-nationale-chaudiere-appalaches/etudes-avant-2020/Etudes-besoins-2019-10-21.pdf) contains a revealing detail. After the November 2018 change of government, the engineering consortium's mandate was revised: assessing the "justification and need to intervene" was removed from the needs study.
This does not prove engineers had decided the project was unnecessary. It does show that officials were asked to study needs and solutions in a framework where the political decision to proceed was already decisive. For a project this costly, the sequence should be clear: demonstrate the problem, compare all solutions, then choose the structure—not the reverse.
## Where does the project stand during the 2026 campaign?
On June 25, 2026, the Fréchette government launched [a 45-day international market sounding](https://www.newswire.ca/fr/news-releases/troisieme-lien-entre-quebec-et-levis-le-gouvernement-frechette-lance-l-appel-d-interet-international-831441144.html). It is testing private-sector interest in designing, building, financing and operating an eastern link with a toll. Findings were expected in the fall.
At publication time, [the official project page](https://www.quebec.ca/transports/infrastructures-projets/projets/projets-routiers/capitale-nationale/lien-quebec-levis) still described the project as being in planning. It offered no final route, price or opening schedule. [The responsible minister said](https://www.journaldequebec.com/2026/06/25/la-derniere-chance-pour-la-caq-et-le-3e-lien-lappel-dinteret-est-lance-mais-les-couts-seront-connus-en-2027) the corridor and cost would only be known in spring 2027—after the October 5, 2026 election.
Voters are therefore being asked to judge a major commitment without knowing the exact structure they would fund, the required public contribution, the toll, the guarantees offered to a private partner or who bears the risk if revenue falls short.
## What Quebec should publish before any new commitment
Minimum accountability would require five documents:
1. a contract-by-contract ledger of payments since 2017;
2. an inventory of deliverables for every project version;
3. a matrix showing what was reused, partly reused or abandoned;
4. the termination or amendment cost of every assignment;
5. an independent economic-security analysis with assumptions, probabilities and alternatives.
This would separate normal planning expenses from the cost of political indecision.
## Verdict
The best available answer is neither "zero" nor "$127.6 million wasted."
**Quebec had spent at least $47.3 million by January 31, 2026.** That total mainly covers studies, reports, professional services and communications. **Awarded contracts could reach $127.6 million**, but only a portion had been billed. Some work likely retains value, particularly geotechnical data and regional analysis. Other work was necessarily tied to abandoned versions.
The democratic scandal is not that a megaproject requires studies. It is that after eight years, tens of millions of dollars and repeated changes in direction, the government still does not allow citizens to see, version by version, **what was learned, what was reused and what was paid for nothing**.
## Method
This investigation relies on MTMD budget estimates and financial commitments, official project documents, CDPQ Infra's report, published contracts and news reports citing ministry compilations. Figures are reported at their stated dates and must not be added when they describe different categories.